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ABSTRACT 
In this paper, the current legal relationship between freedom of expression 
and privacy is analysed to determine whether an appropriate legal balance has been 
struck. Both concepts are defined and the values underlying them are determined, so 
that the true nature of their relationship is able to be ascertained. Such an analysis is 
deemed necessary due to the number of incremental advancements in protection for 
privacy in recent years which have affected its relationship with freedom of 
expression. 
The central argument which is advanced is that the developments in the 
relationship which provide enhanced protection for privacy have ensured that an 
appropriate balance has been struck between freedom of expression and 
informational privacy. However, physical privacy has largely been excluded from 
these developments of privacy, and this means that there is currently an imbalance 
between freedom of expression and physical privacy. The case of Brooker v Police is 
considered as a good example of the current imbalance, and the effect of the New 
Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 on the relationship between freedom of expression 
and privacy. 
Following that, suggestions for reform of the law of privacy are provided and 
discussed, to reach an overall conclusion that the best course of action would be to 
include a right to privacy in the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990. 
STATEMENT ON WORD LENGTH: This paper consists of 15 093 words 
( excluding table of contents, abstract, footnotes and bibliography). 
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I INTRODUCTION 
It is indisputable that freedom of expression is a fundamental human right in 
New Zealand and in other western liberal democracies.
1 However, freedom of 
expression must co-exist with a variety of other legal, social and moral rights and 
values in order for society to function effectively. 2 At times, the desire to protect 
competing rights and values will result in law which abrogates the right to freedom of 
expression. As these laws amount to censorship, it is vital that they are enacted and 
applied in such a way that freedom of expression does not become unacceptably 
eroded. This is not an easy task. Other rights and values have also been described as 
fundamental, 3 so the balance to be drawn may be particularly fine. 
Privacy is a right ( or perhaps at this point, it is more appropriate to describe it 
as a value)4 which has a competing relationship with freedom of expression under 
many circumstances. Historically, common law jurisdictions were reluctant to 
recognise that privacy is a right worthy of protection for its own sake, and have even 
expressly denied that there is any right to privacy at common law. 5 Consequently, 
there was little need to determine the correct balance between freedom of expression 
and privacy. However, throughout the late nineteenth and the twentieth centuries, 
privacy has become an increasing concern of both legislatures and judiciaries in 
common law jurisdictions, with the result that there is now a variety of legislation and 
common law causes of action which aim to protect privacy interests. 
As developments in the law which protect privacy interests have necessarily 
had an impact on the exercise of the right to freedom of expression, a number of 
questions have been raised about the nature of privacy; the fundamental value or 
values it purports to protect; whether legal protections for privacy interests constitute 
appropriate limitations on the right to freedom of expression, and, if so, whether the 
1 
Andrew and Petra Butler The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act: A Commenta,y (LexisNexis NZ 
Limited, Wellington, 2003) 303; Living Word Distributors Ltd v Human Rights Action Group Inc 
(Wellington) [2000] 3 NZLR 570, para 77 {CA) Richardson P. 
: Denise Meyerson "The Legitimate Extent ofFreedom of Expression" (2002) U Toronto LJ 331, 332. 
Butler and Butler, above n 1, 132-133. 
4 Wainwright v Home Office [2003] UKHL 53 , para 31 Hoffman LJ. 
5 
Law Commission "Privacy Concepts and Issues: Review of the Law of Privacy Stage One" (January 
2008, Wellington) para 4.1. 
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legal relationship between the right to freedom of expression and privacy interests has 
been correctly determined; and whether reform of the law needs to be undertaken in 
order to achieve a more appropriate balance. The purpose of this paper is to provide 
answers to these questions in a New Zealand context. 
In order to provide comprehensive answers to the aforementioned 
considerations, a number of steps will need to be taken. Firstly, freedom of expression 
and privacy will be defined, and the values which underlie them will be explained. 
This step is necessary to ensure that the basis from which the following analysis will 
be undertaken is clear. After that, the legislation and common law which currently 
regulate the relationship between freedom of expression and privacy in New Zealand 
will be described and analysed in light of the values which underlie them, to 
determine whether the law achieves an appropriate balance. Special emphasis will be 
placed on the 2007 New Zealand Supreme Court case Brooker v Po!ice6 as it serves as 
a particularly good example of current uncertainties and problems in the regulation of 
the relationship. Finally, various proposals for reform of the law in order to address 
any deficiencies which are evident will be analysed. The goal of the final analysis is 
to provide a recommendation for appropriate reform. 
II DEFINITIONS AND UNDERLYING VALUES OF FREEDOM OF 
EXPRESSION AND PRIVACY 
In this section, freedom of expression and privacy will be defined and the 
values which underlie each of them will be described, in order to show why their legal 
protection is necessary in New Zealand society today. 
A Definition of Freedom of Expression 
At first glance, freedom of expression seems simple to define. In fact, its 
simplicity is deceptive, as it is generally understood to protect more than simply the 
6 [2007] 3 NZLR 91 (SC) . 
5 
right of everyone to communicate what they wish to communicate to others. The 
ambit of freedom of expression varies depending on the jurisdiction in which the right 
is being called upon. 7 For this reason, it is submitted that the most appropriate way of 
defining freedom of expression in the New Zealand context is by recourse to its 
definition in the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (BORA). 
Section 14 of BORA states that "everyone has the right to freedom of 
expression, including the freedom to seek, receive and impart information and 
opinions of any kind in any _ form." Immediately, it is apparent that freedom of 
expression protects more than just the ability to communicate. It also encompasses the 
right to search for information and opinions and to receive the communications which 
others wish to express, whether those communications express information, or 
opinion. Butler and Butler point out that the way that freedom of expression is drafted 
in BORA is capable of encompassing even more than the explicit examples of acts 
which form part of the definition, as the word "including" denotes a non-exclusive list 
in accordance with orthodox statutory interpretation practice. 8 '9 It is evident, therefore, 
that Parliament intended that the right should be interpreted in an extremely broad 
way. 
It is also important to determine what exactly what is meant by "expression" 
in this definition. Expression has been described by the New Zealand Court of Appeal 
as being "as wide as human thought and imagination. " 10 The fact that section 14 of 
BORA states that information and opinions "of any kind in any form" are protected 
within the ambit of the right suggests that this interpretation is the correct one. 
However, it must be noted that the New Zealand courts have not expressly interpreted 
"expression" in BORA, and have preferred instead to determine on a case by case 
basis whether or not section 14 applies to the particular situations with which they are 
7 Grant Huscroft "The Constitutional and Cultural Underpinnings of Freedom of Expression : Lessons 
from the United States and Canada" (2006) 25 U Queensland LJ 181 , 183. 
8 Butler and Butler, above n I , 310. 
9 Peter Langan Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes (Sweet and Maxwell , London 1969) 270. 
I O Moonen v Film and Literature Board of Review (2000] 2 NZLR 9, para 15 (CA) Tipping J for the 
Court. 
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presented. 11 This makes the conclusion which has been arrived at in the course of the 
analysis more tenuous than is preferable. 
In the absence of a clear New Zealand precedent as to exactly what constitutes 
"expression," it has been suggested that Canadian jurisprudence on the issue is an 
appropriate avenue for guidance. 12 This approach is considered appropriate as the 
drafters of BORA were influenced by the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 
when they were deciding how the BORA rights ought to be articulated. 13 Canadian 
jurisprudence does provide further guidance in regard to the meaning of "expression." 
In a case which was heard by the Supreme Court of Canada, it was determined that "if 
the activity conveys or attempts to convey a meaning, it has expressive content and 
prima facie falls within the scope of the guarantee [of freedom of expression under the 
Charter ]". 14 Again, the emphasis is on the breadth of freedom of expression. This is 
consistent with the other analysis which has been undertaken in this paper. 
In conclusion, the right to freedom of expression in New Zealand is extremely 
broad, and it would appear that it encompasses any activity which is able to convey 
meaning or by which information or opinions are able to be obtained. It is indeed "as 
wide as human thought and imagination." 15 
B Values Underlying the Right to Freedom of Expression 
As the discussion above has shown, the right to freedom of expression is 
capable of applying to, and therefore protecting, an almost endless variety of 
expressive acts. How, then, is it possible to determine when it ought to be abrogated 
in favour of another interest? It is submitted that the appropriate method of 
determining the relative strength of an assertion of the right to freedom of expression 
is to compare the particular expression at issue in the circumstances in which it is 
11 Butler and Butler, above n I , 3 11 . 
12 Butler and Butler, above n I , 3 12. 
13 Ministry of Justice A Bill of Rights fo r New Zealand: A White Paper (Government Publisher, 
Wellington, 1985) para 10.1. 
14 ln11in Toy v Attorney-General (Quebec) [ 1989) I SCR 927, 696 (SCC) Dickson CJ. 
15 Moonen v Film and Literature Board of Review, above n 10, para 15 Tipping J for the Court. 
7 
being undertaken to the values which underlie the right to freedom of expression. It is 
only those instances of expression which are consistent with the underlying values of 
the right to freedom of expression that are worthy of protection in a case where there 
is a competing consideration. If the expressive act in no way furthers the achievement 
of the values which underlie freedom of expression, then it ought to give way in 
favour of the competing interest. However, it should also be noted that in a case 
where freedom of expression does not further any of the values which underlie the 
right, but where it does not conflict with another right or value, such expression 
should remain protected by th~ right, as there is no compelling reason to abrogate it 
under those circumstances. 
There is widespread agreement about values which underlie freedom of 
expression. Each of these will be described and considered in turn below. 
1 Freedom of expression is necessary for the effective functioning of a 
democracy 
One of the concepts which justifies protecting a right to freedom of expression 
is that it is an essential component of a successful democracy. 
16 This is a structural, or 
consequentialist justification for freedom of expression.
17 These types of justification 
are based on the idea that freedom of expression needs to be protected as it is 
necessary for the functioning of particular societal structures.
18 They contrast with 
rights-based justifications which argue that freedom of expression ought to be 
protected for its own sake. 19 Consequently, when this justification is taken into 
account, the value which is placed on the societal structure that freedom of expression 
is purported to promote in the circumstances of the case will assist in determining 
whether freedom of expression should preside over a competing right or value. 
16 Butler and Butler, above n 1, 308. 
17 Larry Alexander ls There a Right to Freedom of Expression? (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2005) 127. 
18 Ibid. 
19 
David A Strauss "Rights and the System ofFreedom of Expression" (1993) U Chi Legal F 197, 198 . 
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This justification for protecting a right to freedom of expression is fairly 
straight-forward. It is necessary for citizens living under a democratic government to 
be able to assess the performance of that government so that they are able to re-elect it 
or choose to elect an alternative government at the next election.2° Consequently, 
freedom of expression needs to be protected to ensure that citizens are freely able to 
access and express information and opinions about the performance of government. 
It is submitted that this is a particularly important justification for freedom of 
expression. Democracy is the very foundation of New Zealand society, and therefore 
rights and institutions which allow democracy to function are fundamental. It is 
further submitted that this means that there is a greater justification for protecting 
expressive acts which constitute political expression when it comes into conflict with 
a competing right or interest than there is in protecting expressive acts which are not 
political in character. 21 Examples of non-political expressive acts include those which 
are purely creative and those which are scientific. Consequently, where a 
determination is being made over whether freedom of expression or a conflicting right 
or value ought to be upheld in a particular situation, it will be useful to enquire as to 
whether the expressive act is political expression or not. 
The submission above should be read in conjunction with the following 
consideration. The question of whether or not an expressive act is a political statement 
may not be clear-cut in all cases. For example, if the intention of the person who is 
performing the expressive act is to make a political statement, but it is impossible for 
those people who witness the expressive act to deduce that the expressive act is a 
political statement, should that expressive act be protected in the event of a conflict or 
not? Arguably, there is less justification for protecting expression under this head of 
justification if that expression is not able to be received by the audience. Democracy 
does not work in a vacuum, and so opinions which are not able to be received by their 
intended audience are unnecessary for the proper functioning of a democracy. As long 
as the person who holds those opinions is able to vote in a manner which is consistent 
with them, it is not necessary for the functioning of democracy for that person to be 
20 Alexander, above n 17, 136. 
21 George Devenish "Freedom of Expression: The Marketplace of Ideas" (1995) JS Afr L 442, 444 . 
9 
protected in the exercise of expressing his or her opinions. This view is supported by 
Strauss, who states that it is the audience which receives the expression which should 
be the primary consideration in analysis involving those justifications which are 
structural in nature, not the person who is undertaking the expressive act.
22 
Even when the consideration above of the difficulty which may occur in the 
course of a determination of whether an expressive act amounts to political expression 
or not is taken into account, it is concluded that some types of expression are a 
necessary conduit of the demo.cratic state. In the vast majority of cases, it will be clear 
whether or not an expressive act has the character of political expression. 
Consequently, it is still an important consideration to be taken into account when 
determining whether or not an expressive act ought to be protected when it conflicts 
with another right or interest. 
2 Freedom of expression is necessary to ensure the proper functioning of the 
marketplace of ideas 
The marketplace of ideas theory has been posited as a justification for 
protecting a right to freedom of expression for centuries. 
23 Like the justification which 
states that freedom of expression is a necessary component of a democratic society, 
this theory is structuralist or consequentialist in nature. 
This theory for the protection of freedom of expression is based on the notion 
that freedom of expression is necessary to further the pursuit of truth in society. 
24 It 
suggests that truth is only able to be ascertained if people are free to communicate 
their ideas, thoughts and feelings and to criticise the ideas, thoughts and feelings of 
others without being restricted. 25 
22 Strauss, above n 19, 201-202. 
23 Devenish, above n 21 , 442. 
24 Butler and Butler, above n I 307. 
25 ' Alexander, above n 17, 128. 
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Although there are a number of criticisms of this theory, for example, that it 
assumes that there is such a thing as objective truth,26 there is also obvious appeal in 
the argument. Human advancement depends on the achievement of ''truth" in all 
spheres of society, and if truth is unable to be achieved, then continuing debate and 
reflection is necessary to determine the appropriate place short of absolute truth that a 
particular idea or concept should attain. Much of scholarly achievement has occurred 
through the process of ideas being communicated, critiqued, and revised in order to 
take account of the critique; and new ideas being presented which were inspired by 
the shortcomings in those ideas which have been expressed before. The marketplace 
of ideas theory effectively states that if this process is extrapolated so that it applies to 
society in general, that the same result will occur: through a gradual process of 
analysis of thought and opinion, eventually the thought or opinion which is closest to 
the truth will be able to preside. 
In terms of analysing whether a particular expressive act should be protected 
by the right to freedom of expression in accordance with this theory, consideration 
will need to be taken of the level of that act's contribution to the marketplace of ideas. 
It is also possible that a hierarchy of ideas in the marketplace will need to be 
determined, as not all contributions to the marketplace of ideas will be equal. 27 A 
relatively trivial expressive act may nevertheless deserve protection if it is in conflict 
with another right or value if that expressive act contributes to the marketplace of 
ideas in a particularly important sphere of society. The most obvious example is 
political expression. A single protestor who wishes to peacefully demonstrate in the 
grounds of Parliament about virtually any political issue is (almost) always protected 
in doing so, despite the fact that the protest is unlikely to even be noticed by 
Parliamentarians and his or her presence may conflict with the Speaker's right to 
determine who is welcome on Parliament grounds and who is trespassing. In contrast, 
an expressive act which is backed up by considerable analysis and reflection may not 
deserve protection if it is in conflict with another right or value if that expressive act 
contributes to the marketplace of ideas in a relatively obscure sphere of society. An 
26 Grant Huscroft "Freedom of Expression" in Grant Huscroft, Scott Optican, Richard Mahoney and 
Paul Rishworth The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 2003) 
309. 
27 Yves de Montigny "The Difficult Relationship between Freedom of Expression and Its Reasonable 
Limits" (1992) 55 Law and Contemp Probs 35, 50. 
11 
example is if I was to write a lengthy dissertation on my favourite character on the 
television programme Green Wing, and my desire to express it by getting it published 
was in conflict with publishing companies' rights to make decisions about only 
publishing material which is likely to actually be interesting to their target markets. 
In conclusion, the marketplace of ideas theory is an important consideration in 
any determination of whether a particular expressive act should be protected by the 
right to freedom of expression or whether it should yield to a competing interest. 
However, as not all mark~tplaces of ideas are equally worthy of protection, 
consideration would have to be made of the marketplace in question in the particular 
circumstances of each case, and whether that marketplace is worth protecting to the 
detriment of a competing right or interest. 
3 Freedom of expression is necessary for self-fulfilment 
A further justification for protecting a right to freedom of expression is that it 
promotes human self-fulfilment. 28 This is an example of a "rights-based" justification, 
which contends that freedom of expression ought to be an end in itself,
29 rather than a 
means to a more fundamental end as is the case with structural or consequentialist 
justifications. 3° Consequently, the person who undertakes an expressive act, or the 
person who endeavours to receive information from an expressive act are the primary 
consideration in this context. 
The argument that a right to freedom of expression ought to be protected to 
attain the goal of human self-fulfilment is predicated on the belief that undertaking 
expressive acts and receiving information from expressive acts committed by others 
enables people to achieve their full potential as members of society. 
31 It is closely 
related to the concept of inviolate personality, that each ofus has a right to pursue the 
28 Butler and Butler, above n I , 309. 
29 Strauss, above n 19, 198. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Butler and Butler, above n I , 309. 
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courses of action which make us feel happy and fulfilled by virtue of the fact that we 
are all members ofhumankind. 32 
It is submitted that this is one of the most difficult values which underlie 
freedom of expression to balance against other competing rights and values. 
Theoretically, all people are considered to have an equal right to self-fulfilment as all 
people are considered to be equal. If one person wishes to fulfil themselves by 
undertaking an expressive act and another person wishes to fulfil themselves by 
refraining from being subjected to that act, then whose right ought to be preferred? As 
all expressive acts will involve the quest for self-fulfilment, it is perhaps more 
appropriate that this consideration be secondary to those already mentioned above 
when a determination over which of competing rights ought to be preferred in cases 
where it comes into question. The correct approach to take will depend on the facts of 
any particular case, so there is little point in undertaking any more generalised 
discussion about it here. 
4 Freedom of expression functions as a societal safety valve 
A final justification for protecting a right to freedom of expression is that it 
ensures that expressive acts which are potentially damaging to society are not made 
even more damaging by being driven underground. 33 Again, this is a structural 
argument. It relies on the assumption that people will openly express their thoughts 
and opinions if their ability to do so is protected and, consequently, opinion which is 
at the margins of that of the majority of society will not result in conspiracy and other 
activities which are considered damaging to society. 34 
It is difficult to see how this consideration could be included in the analysis for 
the determination of whether a particular expressive act ought to be protected in the 
event that it competes with another right or interest. Perhaps the best way of ensuring 
that it is given effect is to note that it demonstrates that expressive acts which involve 
unpopular views ought not to be given lesser protection than those which are more 
32 Edward J Blaustein "Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean Prosser" (1964) 
39 NYU L Rev 962, 971. 
33 Butler and Butler, above n I , 309. 
34 Ibid. 
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acceptable to society. Indeed, if only widely-accepted views were able to be protected 
by the right to freedom of expression, other underlying values such as the importance 
of self-fulfilment and of the effective functioning of the marketplace of ideas would 
be undermined also. This justification can therefore be seen as supplementary to those 
other values. 
5 Conclusion 
The above analysis has shown that there are a variety of values which underlie 
the right to freedom of expression. These values are either important for the 
functioning of a successful democratic society, or are important for the protection of 
human dignity. It is therefore easy to see why it has been considered necessary to take 
steps to legally protect freedom of expression. Each of the underlying values should 
be taken into account whenever a determination is being made over whether freedom 
of expression ought to be abrogated in order to protect a competing right or interest. 
This approach should ensure that the most important exercises of what is already 
considered to be a fundamental human right are able to be adequately protected in the 
case of a conflict, while other interests which may also be considered fundamental are 
able to abrogate the freedom of expression in appropriate cases. 
C Definition of Privacy 
In order to undertake a discussion about the legal value of privacy, it is 
necessary to define what is meant by the term. Unlike the freedom of expression, 
there is no single legal definition in New Zealand which can be used to succinctly 
capture the essential qualities of a right to (or value of) privacy. Indeed, there has 
been a large amount of academic debate over what the definition of privacy ought to 
encompass. 35 Consequently, a number of the different suggestions for definitions will 
be presented here and critiqued, with the aim of arriving at an appropriate theoretical 
definition on which the rest of the discussion can be appropriately based. 
35 
See, for example, Ruth Gavison "Privacy and the Limits of the Law" (1980) 89 Yale LJ 421 , 437; 
Louis Henkin " Privacy and Autonomy'' 74 Col um L Rev 1420, 1420-142 I ; Sidney Jourard "Some 
Psychological Aspects of Privacy" (1966) 31 Law & Con temp Probs 307, 318 . 
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1 Privacy as the 'right to be let alone' 
One of the earliest and most enduring definitions of privacy, described by 
Gavison as "often attributed - incorrectly - to Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis",36 
is that privacy denotes the ''right to be let alone. "37 This definition was actually first 
proposed by Justice Cooley of the Unites States Supreme Court writing extra-
judicially38 and has endured in the United States since. At first glance, the definition 
appears to be convincing. It is favoured by Prosser, who states, in his influential 
article on the right to privacy in the United States, that the only thing that the 
disparate situations in which a right to privacy has been successfully protected by 
United States courts have in common, is that they are all instances of people asking to 
be let alone. 39 
The appeal of the definition of privacy as the "right to be let alone" has led to 
its adoption by the United States Supreme Court in matters regarding the 
interpretation of the fourth and fourteenth amendments to the United States 
Constitution.40 The Court has fashioned a right to be let alone from these two 
constitutional provisions and has used this right to strike down state and federal law 
which is inconsistent with the broad right. 41 There are many circumstances under 
which this right to be let alone has been invoked by the Court to strike down United 
States federal legislation due to unconstitutionality. The types of laws which have 
been struck down in this manner are extremely diverse. Examples include laws 
regulating the provision of contraception42 and abortion,43 through to laws which 
require parents to send their children to public schools. 44 
36 Gavison, above n 35, 437. 37 Ibid. 
38 
Daniel Watterson "Privacy in the Home: A Critical Evaluation of Existing Protections" (LLB(Hons) 
Research Paper, Victoria University of Wellington, 2007) 8. 39 William L Prosser "Privacy'' (1960) 48 Cal L Rev 383, 389. 40 Ibid, 387. 
4 1 Ibid. 
42 Griswold v Connecticut (1965) 38 1 US 479, 484 Douglas J for the Court. 43 Roe v Wade (1973) 410 US 113, 151-152 Blackmun J for the Court. 44 Pierce v. Society of Sisters ( 1925) 268 US 510, 536 Mc Reynolds J for the Court. 
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It is in the jurisprudence of the United States Supreme Court that the 
difficulties with this particular definition of privacy can be ascertained. Consider the 
example provided above of a law being struck down which required parents to send 
their children to public schools. There is no doubt that such a law would interfere in 
the lives of citizens, contrary to a right "to be let alone." There is also no doubt that 
such a law would cause offence to a number of parents who would prefer to have the 
option to send their children to private school. Yet the interference contemplated by 
the law and the offence or damage which it would cause are not those which are 
intuitively understood to breach a right to privacy as such. Decisions about schooling 
lack a quality which is usually associated with privacy. In short, decisions about 
schooling are not those which a person would ordinarily expect to make while they 
were completely shielded from the rest of society and decisions about schooling are 
not usually those which one would feel it was "improper" or "impolite" to enquire 
about. Enforcing the right to make such decisions without interference from the 
government as an instance of protection for a "right to privacy" is therefore 
problematic. 
Wacks has convincingly argued that the problem with this definition of 
privacy is that it confuses privacy with autonomy.
45 Although the two concepts are 
related, share some of the same underlying values, and may overlap in some 
situations, they are conceptually different. An assertion of a right to autonomy is 
concerned with allowing people to make their own decisions for themselves in 
situations where there is no compelling reason for interference. An assertion of a right 
to privacy is both broader and, in some respects, narrower than that. Consequently, 
the definition of privacy as ''the right to be let alone" must be dismissed as an 
appropriate definition on which to base legal protection of privacy. 
2 Privacy as the right to control over personal information 
45 
Raymond Wacks "The Poverty of Privacy'' {1980) 96 LQR 73 , 78. 
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Another popular definition of privacy, favoured by commentators such as 
Jourard is that privacy is the right to have control over personal information.46 
Certainly, when someone desires privacy, sometimes what is desired is the right to 
keep personal information pertaining to that individual from being known about by 
any other person. Alternatively, that person may wish to disclose the personal 
information to a limited number of others, without those others being able to 
disseminate it to the world at large. Consequently, it has been determined in many 
jurisdictions that there ought to be legal protection for the right of individuals to 
exercise that control under appropriate circumstances. A good example of this 
conception of privacy is the law which protects doctor/patient confidentiality. Medical 
matters are generally considered by society at large to constitute the personal 
information of the individual to which they pertain. Members of society would not 
ordinarily expect to be able to freely acquire information about the medical conditions 
of others. However, the disclosure of that information to a medical practitioner is 
necessary in order for a person who is suffering from an illness to be given an 
effective course of treatment for that illness. In order to ensure that the social 
understanding that the information which is expressed by the patient to the doctor 
remains inaccessible to others unless the patient chooses to disclose it to them, the 
relationship of doctor and patient is considered a fiduciary one under law. The doctor 
is therefore unable to act in any way in regard to the patient which is contrary to the 
patient's interests. Keeping medical information confidential is a tacit aspect of the 
relationship. 
As the discussion above has demonstrated, the argument that privacy should 
be defined as a right to control information about oneself has practical appeal. It is 
certainly true that some situations where one would expect privacy will involve such 
considerations. There have been a wide variety of laws enacted and recognised in 
common law jurisdictions to protect this conception of privacy, including in New 
Zealand.47 However, the obvious flaw in this definition of privacy is that it does not 
encompass all of the situations in which it is commonly understood that a right to 
46 
Jourard , above n 35, 307. 
47 See, for example, Privacy Act 1993 ; Protected Disclosures Act 2000; Hosking v Runting [2005] 
NZLR 5, para 117 (CA) Gault and Blanchard JJ. 
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privacy would cover.48 Moreham has demonstrated this convincingly. In her article 
"Privacy in the Common Law: A Doctrinal and Theoretical Analysis", she provides 
the following example to demonstrate that there are situations in which we would 
intuitively consider that a person's privacy had been violated, but which do not 
involve a loss of the right to control information:
49 
X, who, having recently separated from Y after living with her for several 
years, trains a telescope on her [Y' s] bedroom so that he can watch her getting dressed 
in the morning. It seems unlikely that X would obtain any significant information in 
this situation - X would have seen Y dressing many times before and would know 
what she looks like naked, what clothes she has, and how she goes about dressing in 
the morning. 
This example makes it very clear that a right to privacy should involve more 
than simply legal protection which confers on individuals a level of control over their 
personal information. A person in Y's position who realised that she was being 
watched by X would feel that her privacy had been invaded by X, despite the fact that 
X has not acquired any new information about Y. The definition of privacy as the 
right to have control over personal information must therefore be discarded as it is too 
narrow. There are also potential situations where unwanted physical access to an 
individual will involve an intrusion into their privacy. For brevity, definitions of 
privacy which focus exclusively on this right to restrict unwanted physical access to 
one's person and ignore the aspect of privacy which pertains to having control over 
personal information will not be fully discussed here, as they suffer the same flaw as 
this definition. 
3 Privacy as the right to limit access to the "self" 
A number of theorists have submitted arguments in favour of defining privacy 
as a right to limit access to certain aspects of the "self."50 Under these definitions, 
privacy involves a number of different situations in which it is considered socially 
48 Edward Shils "Privacy: Its Constitution and Vicissitudes ( 1966) 31 Law and Contemp Probs 281 , 
282. 
49 Nicole Moreham "Privacy in the Common Law: A Doctrinal and Theoretical Analysis" (2005) 12 
LQR 628, 649. 
50 Daniel J Solove "Conceptualizing Privacy'' (2002) 90 Cal L Rev I 087, 1102. 
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acceptable for a person who is involved in such situations to choose to restrict the 
access of others. Gavison defines this right as having three separate aspects which she 
describes as secrecy, anonymity and solitude. 5 1 The secrecy aspect of privacy is 
concerned with suppressing personal information from others. 52 The anonymity aspect 
of privacy is concerned with the ability to escape the notice of others. 53 The solitude 
aspect is concerned with a person's ability to prevent others from being able to 
physically access them. 54 
Gavison's definition is an attractive one as it encompasses different common 
situations in which privacy is often relevant whilst simultaneously ensuring that the 
ambit of privacy is not defined too widely. It is also attractive as Gavison ensured that 
her definition of privacy is value-neutral. 55 It describes privacy without conflating the 
definition of privacy with the justifications for protecting it. Although this definition 
has been criticised by Solove as being too narrow,56 it is submitted that in fact it is 
Solove's conception of privacy which is too broad. His definition includes the idea 
that invasions of privacy ought to include invasions into one's personal life in the 
form of government regulation of personal choices. 57 As has been described above in 
relation to the definition of privacy which equates it with ''the right to be let alone," 
such a definition is too broad as it wrongly assumes that privacy and autonomy are 
coterminous. 
It is submitted that, in terms of an analysis of the legal relationship between 
freedom of expression and privacy, the aspect of Gavison' s definition of privacy 
which is concerned with anonymity is not required . It is quite unlikely that there 
would be a situation in which someone would require legal protection of just that 
aspect of privacy, without one of the other two aspects being relevant. A right to 
anonymity can be protected legally by ensuring that information about a person 's 
identity is not able to be legally disclosed under certain circumstances, for example, 
when a person wants to give police information about a crime anonymously. It can 
51 Gavison, above n 35, 428 . 
52 Ibid, 429. 
53 Ibid, 432. 
54 Ibid, 433. 
55 Ibid, 425-426. 
56 Soiove, above n 50, I I 05. 
57 Ibid. 
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also be protected by ensuring that no-one has physical access to a person while they 
are undertaking certain activities. A good example is when people exercise their right 
to vote. No one is allowed physical access to them while they are in the polling booth, 
which means that no one is able to identify which people voted for which candidates 
or parties, if those people wish that information to remain anonymous. 
4 Conclusion 
It is submitted that the modified version of Gavison's definition described 
above is an appropriate one to adopt for the analysis into the legal relationship 
between privacy and freedom of expression. It is broad enough to ensure that all 
situations in which one intuitively feels that there is a privacy interest which ought to 
be given legal protection are not left out and is narrow enough to ensure that values 
and interests which are closely aligned to privacy, but which are not properly equated 
with privacy are not included. The fact that it is value-neutral is also important, as it 
will prevent the question of the value of privacy from being answered by the circular 
logic ofreferring to its definition. 
D Values Underlying Privacy 
As with freedom of expression, it is important to identify the underlying 
values which provide the justification for legal protection of privacy. In a case where 
a right to privacy competes with freedom of expression, it is by comparing the 
particular circumstances in which a person argues that they should have legal 
protection for their privacy with the underlying values of privacy, that it is possible to 
determine which right ought to prevail. If the particular claim of a right to privacy is 
made in a situation in which the underlying values are not engaged, or are engaged 
only to a slight degree, then that claim ought to be subordinated to the competing 
claim for freedom of expression. 
It will be argued in this section that the various values which are suggested by 
commentators to underlie privacy are all just different ways of saying the same thing: 
that privacy protects the value of human dignity, or inviolate personality. This 
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justification for protecting privacy is rights-based,58 rather than structuralist like a 
number of the justifications for protecting freedom of expression. 
In order to present the argument that the underlying value of privacy is the 
desire to protect human dignity, the following steps will be taken. Firstly, the 
suggestion that privacy is worth protecting as it assists in the protection of human 
dignity will be explained. Following that, a number of the theories which have been 
advanced in regard to other values underlying privacy will be described and analysed 
in order to show that each of them is just advancing a slightly different conception of 
the basic idea that privacy promotes the protection of human dignity. 
I Protection of privacy is necessary to safeguard human dignity 
It is submitted that the underlying value of privacy is the desire to protect 
human dignity, or inviolate personality. The concept of human dignity is the idea that 
all human beings are entitled to an equal amount of basic respect from others, by 
virtue of the fact that we are all members of humankind.59 It also encompasses the 
idea that we are required to show others that respect. It recognises the fact that all 
people have unique personalities made up of thoughts and feelings; and experiences 
and dreams; and ensures that everyone is able to retain their unique personalities as 
far as is consistent with their membership in society. 60 
The notion that protection of privacy is based on the underlying value of 
respect for human dignity is argued convincingly by Bloustein.61 In his article 
"Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean Prosser," he states that 
those commentators who are unable to see a commonality between all the instances in 
which we intuitively consider a privacy interest to be involved have that problem 
because they focus their considerations on the different kinds of harm that an 
intrusion upon privacy can cause, rather than the underlying interest that the right to 
58 Alexander, above n 17, 128. 
59 Harry Kalven Jr " Privacy in Tort Law: Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?" ( 1966) 31 Law and 
Con temp Probs 326, 326. 
60 Bloustein, above n 32,961. 
61 Ibid, 971. 
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privacy protects.62 Examples of different kinds of harm which can be caused by 
different types of invasions of privacy include emotional distress when someone has 
physical access to a person at a time when they wish to be alone;
63 and damage to 
reputation when someone publishes facts about a person which that person does not 
wish to disclose. 64 Bloustein argues that both of these harms, although quite different 
from each other, occur because the invader of the individual's privacy has shown 
disrespect for the victim's human dignity in a situation where that human dignity 
ought reasonably to have been respected.
65 
It is now necessary to tum to the question of how human dignity should fit 
into an enquiry into whether an alleged right to privacy should be given legal 
protection in a particular case. It is submitted that, when a person alleges that their 
privacy has been intruded upon by another person or the state, and that other person 
( or the state) argues that their intrusion ought to be allowed as it constitutes an 
exercise of the right to freedom of expression, an enquiry should be made into the 
extent to which that intrusion poses a violation of the complainant's human dignity 
and whether such an intrusion would be acceptable to a reasonable person. 
66 If it is 
concluded that the intrusion would be acceptable to a reasonable person, then the right 
to freedom of expression ought to prevail over the competing right to privacy. In 
some cases, this will be easy to ascertain. In others, as freedom of expression has a 
number of disparate underlying values, some of which are also effectively based on a 
right to human dignity, the balance may need to be drawn between two people's rights 
to protect their human dignity. In such cases, it will be a lot more difficult to make a 
determination in regard to whose dignity ought to be protected at the expense of the 
other's. 
2 Protection of privacy promotes other underlying values 
62 Ibid, 970. 
63 Prosser, above n 39, 390. 
64 Ibid, 398. 
65 Bloustein , above n 32, 973. 
66 
Robert C Post "The Social Foundations of Privacy: Community and Self in the Common Law Tort" 
(1989) 77 Cal L Rev 957,961. 
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In this section, a number of other theories of the underlying values of privacy 
will be briefly described and analysed to show that they actually describe an aspect of 
human dignity. 
(a) Privacy allows us to build love, trust and friendship 
Fried argues that protection for privacy is necessary as it is needed in order to 
allow people to build love, trust and friendship. 67 Ultimately, what he is arguing is that 
privacy is a necessary condition for humans to be able to foster relationships with one 
another. It is not difficult to show that this is simply one of the aspects of human 
dignity. In fact, Fried effectively admits this himself, stating that his underlying 
values of pnvacy "build on a common conception of personality and its 
entitlements. " 68 
(b) Privacy is needed in order to maintain mental health 
Jourard argues that privacy is needed in order to protect the mental health of 
individuals. 69 In his argument, he states that when we interact in society, we are forced 
to conform to societal norms, forcing us to behave in ways which we may not choose 
to behave if we were able to make the choice. 7° Consequently, privacy is needed in 
order for us to behave in ways in which we feel are more consistent with our 
individual personalities but which we are unable to indulge in while we are in public, 
due to fears that we may be exiled by society for our non-conformity with the 
accepted norms of behaviour. 71 If privacy is not protected, then Jourard claims that 
both individuals and society as a whole will suffer. 72 
Again, it is not too difficult to see that the concern with mental health is an 
aspect of protecting human dignity. Mental health is intimately connected to one' s 
personality, and it is the inviolate human personality that the concept of human 
dignity is designed to protect. 
67 Charles Fried " Privacy" (1968) 77 Yale LJ 475, 478. 
68 Ibid. 
69 Jourard, above n 35, 308. 
70 Ibid. 
71 Ibid. 
72 Ibid, 316. 
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3 Conclusion 
The above analysis shows that, despite arguments that pnvacy protects a 
variety of underlying interests, it in fact ultimately protects human dignity. 
Consequently, when someone argues that they have suffered an invasion of privacy, it 
will be important to consider the extent to which that invasion constitutes a violation 
of that person's human dignity and whether that aspect of human dignity ought to be 
given legal protection. 
E Conclusion 
The preceding analysis has provided definitions of freedom of expression and 
of privacy which will be used for the remainder of the paper. It has been concluded 
that the best definition of freedom of expression in the New Zealand context is that 
which is enacted in BORA,73 and that the best definition of privacy is the modified 
version of the definition advanced by Gavison: that privacy involves desired secrecy 
and solitude. This will enable a coherent discussion of the relationship of the two 
terms to be undertaken in later sections of the paper. 
Additionally, the values which underlie freedom of expression and privacy 
have been explained so that it is clear why each of them is deserving of at least some 
measure of legal protection. There are a number of accepted underlying values of 
freedom of expression, including the concept that freedom of expression is vital for 
the successful operation of a democratic state; that freedom of expression is necessary 
in order to ensure the successful operation of the marketplace of ideas; that freedom 
of expression promotes human self-fulfilment; and that freedom of expression acts as 
a societal safety valve that reduces the likelihood of political conspiracies and 
revolutions. The only true underlying value of privacy is human dignity or the concept 
of the inviolate personality. It is by recourse to the underlying values of each of the 
rights that a balancing exercise in regard to which right should prevail in a case where 
they conflict will be able to be undertaken. Consequently, the values which underlie 
73 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 14. 
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freedom of expression and privacy should form an important aspect of their legal 
personalities. 
III THE CURRENT LEGAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FREEDOM OF 
EXPRESSION AND PRIVACY 
In this section, the current legal relationship between freedom of expression 
and privacy will be described and analysed in light of the values that underlie the two 
rights in order to determine whether an appropriate legal balance has been struck 
between them. The central argument in this section will be that the balance is 
appropriate when the aspect of privacy which is concerned with secrecy or the right to 
have control over personal information is considered, due to a number of 
developments in statutory and common law. However, it will also be argued that the 
balance between freedom of expression and the aspect of privacy which is concerned 
with solitude or the right to be free from unwanted physical access is not appropriate, 
with freedom of expression being protected to the detriment of privacy in a number of 
cases in which such a balance is unjustified. 
A Legal Protection for Freedom of Expression 
Interestingly, the history of legal protection for freedom of expression is 
similar to that of privacy. For a long time, freedom of expression received only 
indirect protection by the common law. 74 The current legal position is very different to 
the historical one. Although there are still few laws which directly protect freedom of 
expression, the right now enjoys a constitutionally important place in New Zealand 
law. In this section, the legal status of freedom of expression as it pertains to the legal 
status of privacy in New Zealand will be described. 
1 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 
74 Butler and Butler, above n I, 305 . 
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As has been previously mentioned, freedom of expression is one of the rights 
included in BORA. 75 Its inclusion in BORA ensures that freedom of expression enjoys 
a constitutionally important status in New Zealand. By virtue of section six of BORA, 
all enactments must be given a meaning by the courts which is consistent with the 
rights contained within BORA where such a meaning is possible. This means that the 
courts are required to interpret legislation in such a way that enables freedom of 
expression to be protected as far as is possible where that legislation is relevant to the 
right. It will also become apparent that the status of freedom of expression as a BORA 
right has meant that it has. enjoyed a more protected status than rights and values 
which are not included in BORA. 76 
2 Official Information Act 1982 
The Official Information Act 1982 (OIA) is a particularly important statute for 
protecting freedom of expression against competing assertions of a right to privacy. It 
ensures that individuals are able to freely acquire information which is held by 
government, due to its principle of availability. 77 Consequently, information will only 
be able to be withheld from an individual who wishes to access it if one of the reasons 
for withholding information is satisfied. There are a number of sections which 
regulate the circumstances under which information may be withheld. 78 One of these 
sections allows information to be withheld in order to protect the privacy of natural 
persons. 79 It should be noted, however, that if the holder of the information wishes to 
withhold it on the basis of protecting privacy, it may only be withheld if the interest in 
protecting privacy outweighs all other interests in disclosing the information.80 
Consequently, the OIA provides comprehensive protection for freedom of expression. 
This Act affirms the idea that freedom of expression is vital for the proper 
functioning of democracy. It also indirectly furthers the expansion of the marketplace 
of ideas, as it gives individuals access to the resources they need to form opinions and 
75 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 14. 
76 Brooker v Police, above n 6, para 40 Elias CJ. 
77 Official In formation Act 1982, s 5. 
78 Official Information Act 1982, ss 5-9. 
79 Official In formation Act 1982, s 6. 
80 Official Information Act 1982, s 9. 
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express those opinions to other members of society. Evidently in matters which 
pertain to the operation of government, it has been determined that freedom of 
expression ought to be preferred over competing privacy interests in the majority of 
cases. 
B Legal Protection for Privacy 
The biggest difference between legal protection for pnvacy and legal 
protection of freedom of expression is that there is no right to privacy included in 
BORA.
81 
Consequently, it is unnecessary for the judiciary to interpret statutes in such 
a way that they are given a meaning which is consistent with a right to privacy. Where 
both freedom of expression and privacy are factors in the interpretation of an 
enactment which does not expressly protect either, judges undertaking the 
interpretation are only required to ensure that the interpretation which is favoured is 
consistent with freedom of expression. Doubt has been expressed as to whether it is 
open to the courts to consider rights and values which are not included in BORA 
when they are undertaking this exercise. 82 Consequently, it is possible that a variety of 
legislation will be interpreted in such a way that freedom of expression is assured to 
the detriment of any relevant privacy interests. In a later section of this paper, it will 
be argued that this effect of the decision to include freedom of expression as a BORA 
right while excluding a right to privacy has occurred in case law. 
Although there is no right to privacy included in BORA, aspects of privacy are 
protected by a number of statutory, common law, and other measures. These will be 
explained below. 
I Tort of invasion of privacy 
Like in other common law jurisdictions, a tort of invasion of privacy has now 
been recognised in New Zealand after a string of cases in which it was decided that 
8 1 
R v Jeffries [ 1994] I NZLR 290, 302 (CA) Richardson J; Lange v Atkinson [2000] 3 NZLR 385, 396 
(CA) Judgment of the Court. 
82 
Brooker v Police, above n 6, para 40 Elias CJ. 
27 
there are situations in which a privacy interest ought to be given legal protection.
83 
The tort protects the secrecy limb in Gavison's definition of privacy. It allows a 
plaintiff injunctive relief:84 or damages,85 depending on the circumstances of the case, 
if he or she is able to prove the following elements:
86 
1. The existence of facts in respect of which there 1s a reasonable 
expectation of privacy; and 
2. Publicity given to those private facts that would be considered highly 
offensive to ~ reasonable person. 
If the two elements are proven, the plaintiff's action will be successful, unless 
the defendant is able to prove that there was a legitimate public interest in the 
publication of the information at issue.87 
Immediately, it is clear that the current formulation of the tort is incapable of 
protecting the aspect of privacy which is concerned with undesired physical access to 
an individual. Despite this shortcoming, it is submitted that the way the tort is 
formulated is an appropriate balance between a defendant's right to freedom of 
expression and a plaintiff's right to informational privacy for a number of reasons 
which will be explained below. 
The first limb of the test ensures that the plaintiff is not able to use the tort to 
stifle the expression of the defendant in situations in which reasonable members of 
society would consider that no privacy interest is involved. It ensures that the vast 
majority of material that a defendant wants to add to the marketplace of ideas is able 
to enter that marketplace. For example, a magazine was able to publish photos of a 
celebrity's children which were taken while they were out for a walk with their 
83 See, for example, Tucker v Newsmedia Ownership Ltd [ 1986] 2 NZLR 716 (HC); Bradley v Wingnut 
Films [1993] 1 NZLR 415 (HC); P v D [2000] 2 NZLR 591 (HC); L v G [2002] DCR 234; Hosking v 
Runting, above n 45. 
84 Hosking v Runting, above n 47, para 149 Gault P and Blanchard J. 
85 L v G, above n 83, 250 Judge Abbott. 
86 Hosking v Runting, above n 47, para 117 Gault P and Blanchard J. 
87 Ibid, para 129 Gault P and Blanchard J. 
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mother in a public street, denying the parents' assertion that publishing the photos 
would be an invasion of their children's privacy. 88 
The second limb ensures that it is only the most serious cases of invasion of 
privacy which will receive the protection of the tort. For example, it was decided that 
an invasion of privacy of the requisite level of seriousness had occurred in a case 
where a man published a photo of a woman's genitals in an adult lifestyle magazine 
without her consent,89 and was denied in a case where a prominent tombstone was 
shown in the background of a film. 90 This ensures that human dignity is protected, but 
only in cases in which the vast majority of the public would think that such dignity 
had been violated seriously enough to warrant legal redress. 
The defence of public interest is also particularly important as it ensures that, 
in appropriate cases, a fact situation which is able to satisfy the requirements of the 
tort may nevertheless fail if there is a compelling reason that the information ought to 
be added to the marketplace of ideas. The defence will be satisfied in cases such as 
those where private information about a politician which affects his or her job 
performance is at issue. The defence has been satisfied in the United Kingdom in 
respect of their analogous tort of breach of confidence where a newspaper was 
vindicated in its decision to publish information about the drug problems of a 
supermodel who had previously held herself out as a drug-free role model. 91 It is 
submitted that such protection is required in order to ensure that freedom of 
expression is able to fulfil its role of ensuring the effective operation of a democracy 
and to ensure that the marketplace of ideas is not inappropriately stifled. As 
democracy is the basis of New Zealand society, strong measures are required to 
ensure that it is protected and supported. 
2 Privacy Act 1993 
Again, this measure of protection for privacy interests is concerned with the 
information aspect of privacy only. It regulates the use that "agencies" (which 
88 Ibid, para I 64 Gault P and Blanchard J. 
89 L v G, above n 83, 250 Judge Abbott . 
90 Bradley v Wingnut Films, above n 83 , 430 Gallen J. 
9 1 Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] UKHL 22, para 82 Hope o f Craighead LJ. 
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includes individuals, private compames, public compames and government 
institutions )92 are able to make of personal information. It requires that agencies only 
obtain personal information in the course of legal activities which are necessary to 
one of the functions of the agent. 93 It also requires that an agency which collects 
personal information must keep it only for as long as is necessary, 
94 and it does not 
use that information for any other purpose.
95 
3 Harassment Act 1997 
It has been suggested that the Harassment Act 1997 is capable of providing 
redress for some breaches of privacy.
96 The purpose of the Act is to provide protection 
for people who are being subject to behaviour which amounts to harassment. It is 
submitted that harassment is an invasion of the human dignity of the plaintiff, as acts 
which would be considered to be harassment are those which are directed at the 
plaintiff despite the plaintiffs desire not to be subjected to those acts, even if the acts 
are perfectly legal. This desire to be free of the acts may take the form of desired 
seclusion from the defendant, the secrecy aspect of Gavison's definition of privacy. 
Consequently, the idea that the Harassment Act would be able to be invoked to 
protect some privacy interests is plausible. 
The Harassment Act is extremely flexible. It allows a Court to tailor a solution 
to the particular conduct that is being complained of, as there are many possible acts 
which may amount to harassment in the appropriate circumstances. Before the court 
will intervene and provide relief to the plaintiff, the plaintiff must be able to show that 
the defendant has committed a "specified act" directed at the plaintiff on at least two 
occasions in a 12 month period.
97 Consequently, if someone stood on the footpath 
outside my house and gave me a lecture on exactly what a terrible law student they 
thought I was on at least two occasions after I had told them that I did not wish to 
communicate with them, those two acts (which, it must be remembered, are exercises 
92 Privacy Act 1993, s 2. 
93 Privacy Act 1993, s 6. 
94 Privacy Act 1993, s 6. 
95 Privacy Act 1993, s 6. 
96 Hosking v Runting, above n 47, para 106 Gault P and Blanchard J. 
97 Harassment Act 1997, ss 3 & 9. 
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of the right to freedom of expression, protected by BORA) may amount to specified 
acts for the purposes of the Harassment Act. If the Court determines that it is 
necessary for legal intervention in a particular case, then a restraining order will be 
granted against the defendant.98 As has been previously mentioned, the flexibility of 
the Act allows the court to tailor the solution to the situation which needs to be 
addressed. 99 In the example described above, the terms of the order may be that the 
defendant is unable to attempt to communicate with me while I am in my home. In 
such a case, my privacy interest in solitude, the right to be free from the defendant's 
unwanted intrusion upon my seclusion which occurred when she stood outside my 
house and said things which I could hear, would be protected. Hence, the Harassment 
Act is capable of protecting privacy (and its underlying value of human dignity) to 
some extent. The fact that it allows remedies to be tailored to the situation presented 
means that any remedies which are provided can be crafted in such a way that they do 
not intrude inappropriately on freedom of expression. 
It should be noted that the Harassment Act also contains provisions which 
allow the most serious instances of harassment to constitute a criminal offence. 100 This 
provision may be able to provide enhanced protection for those who suffer from the 
most serious instances of privacy invasions as there is no need for the victim of the 
invasion to pay for a civil suit against the invader, which may be a deterrent to taking 
civil action for some claimants. 
However, there are also problems with the protection for privacy interests 
which the Harassment Act is able to provide. A single invasion of privacy which takes 
the form of undesired physical intrusion will never be actionable under the Act, 
despite the fact that there are circumstances under which a reasonable person may 
wish to have legal redress when an undesired physical intrusion has occurred. 
Consequently, the Harassment Act can only be described as a partial solution to the 
problem of protecting physical privacy interests. 
98 Harassment Act 1997, s 16. 
99 Harassment Act 1997, ss 19-20. 
100 Harassment Act 1997, s 8. 
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4 Other instruments 
In addition to the instruments described above there are also a number of other 
codes and guidelines which include some protection for privacy. In general, th
ese 
protect informational privacy only (the secrecy limb of privacy). Examples inclu
de 
the Credit Reporting Privacy Code, which regulates the way in which debt report
ing 
agencies may deal with personal information which is held about individuals; 
101 the 
four Codes of Broadcasting Practice which regulate decisions made in regard to w
hat 
material is broadcast over free-to-air television, 
102 pay-to-view television, 
103 radio 104 
and election programmes; 105
 the Health Information Privacy Code 1994; and the 
Telecommunications Privacy Code 2003. 
Each of these codes has been specifically enacted to ensure the proper balance 
between the right to freedom of expression which is able to be exercised by the bo
dy 
regulated by the codes and the right to privacy of the individuals about which th
ose 
bodies hold information is maintained. In cases where an individual believes that o
ne 
of the bodies have breached one of these privacy codes, they are able to complain t
o a 
variety of semi-autonomous agencies which have been set up to administer them. If an 
individual who complains does not receive a satisfactory outcome from the govern
ing 
agency, they have the right to petition for a judicial review of the decision. 
C Conclusion 
The aim of this section was to describe the different ways in which the legal 
balance between freedom of expression and privacy is currently being determined a
nd 
to consider whether these measures are appropriate safeguards of the underlyi
ng 
interests. The above description and analysis have shown that, although the m
ain 
protection for freedom of expression is provided by only one statute, 
the 
constitutional nature of that statute has ensured that freedom of expression h
as 
received comprehensive consideration and protection when competing interests 
of 
101 
Office of the Privacy Commissioner "Credit Reporting Privacy Code" (6 December 2
004). 
102 Broadcasting Standards Authority "Free to Air TV Code" (I December 2004). 
103 Broadcasting Standards Authority "Pay TV Code" (I August 2006) . 
104 Broadcasting Standards Authority " Radio Code" ( I July 2008). 
105 Broadcasting Standards Authority "Elections Programmes Code" ( I June 2008). 
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privacy are involved. It is submitted that protecting freedom of expression in this way 
is the best method of ensuring that it is able to support the functioning of successful 
democracy in New Zealand. 
In contrast, there are a wide number of legal and quasi-legal instruments 
which provide protection of privacy against an interest in free expression. Those 
which have been described in detail appear to strike an appropriate balance between 
freedom of expression and privacy, when regard is had to the underlying interests of 
each. However, it must be noted that the vast majority of protection only applies to 
informational privacy. The only instrument which could expressly protect spatial 
privacy against a competing assertion of a right to freedom of expression is the 
Harassment Act 1997. It was determined in the analysis that the Harassment Act 
provides only partial protection of privacy at best, and no protection unless specified 
acts have been undertaken on more than one occasion. Consequently, it is submitted 
that more comprehensive protection for spatial privacy is required. 
IV BROOKER v POLICE: AN APPROPRIATE BALANCE BETWEEN 
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND PRIVACY? 
In this section, the Supreme Court case of Brooker v Police will be described 
and analysed. It serves as an interesting illustration of the interaction between 
freedom of expression and privacy under New Zealand law when the legislation at 
issue does not specifically aim to protect either of the interests. It will be argued that 
the result which was arrived at is an inappropriate balance between freedom of 
expression and privacy, although it is almost certainly a correct application of the 
current law. 
A Facts 
Mr Brooker believed that police constable Fiona Croft had undertaken her 
official duties in an unlawful manner. '06 She had obtained a search warrant for the 
106 Brooker v Police, above n 6, para 13 Elias CJ. 
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forensic examination of a vehicle believed to be on Mr Brooker's property.
107 Police 
arrived there to execute the warrant late one Saturday night in May 2000, but were 
unable to proceed as the vehicle was not at the property. 
108 Even if the vehicle had 
been at the property, there were questions over the likelihood of obtaining evidence 
from it in time for the case in connection with which it was executed, as the case was 
scheduled to be heard on the following Monday.
109 Mr Brooker was of the opinion 
that the constable had acted as she did in order to harass him, rather than in faithful 
pursuit of her official duties. 11 0 
To express his opinion of the constable, on 18 March 2003 (nearly three years 
after the incident with the search warrant), Mr Brooker went to her house at around 
9.00am. 111 He knew that she had been on night duty the previous night.
11 2 He knocked 
on her door until she answered it and made it clear that she wanted him to leave. 
113 He 
retreated to the grass verge outside her property, where he displayed a sign which had 
"No more bogus warrants" written on it.
114 He also began to play his guitar and sing 
songs with lyrics which demonstrated his opinion of the constable's actions. 
11 5 His 
songs were directed at the Constable Croft personally, with lyrics which included ''No 
more bogus warrants, Fiona" (Constable Croft ' s first name) and "you don't know 
when to quit". 11 6 
Constable Croft rang the police station as soon as Mr Brooker had left her 
property. 11 7 She wished to have him removed from the vicinity of her property, which 
on-duty officers did by arresting Mr Brooker for loitering with intent to intimidate 
under s 21(1)(d) of the Summary Offences Act 1981 soon after his protest began.
118 
The charge was amended at trial to one of disorderly behaviour under the same Act, 
'
07 R v Brooker [2004] NZAR 680, para 3 William Young J for the Court. 
'
08 Ibid. 
'
09 Brooker v Police, above n 6, para 13 Elias CJ. 
110 Ibid . 
11 1 Ibid, para 14 Elias CJ. 
11 2 Ibid. 
11 3 Ibid. 
11 4 Ibid . 
115 Ibid. 
11 6 Ibid. 
117 Ibid. 
11 8 Ibid. 
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as the Judge was of the opinion that no evidence of intent to intimidate existed. 119 Mr 
Brooker was convicted 120 and the long process of appealing the conviction followed, 
culminating in the Supreme Court decision that his conviction ought to be quashed. 
B Passage of the Case through the Courts 
Although Brooker was originally arrested for loitering with intent to 
intirnidate, 121 the charge was amended to one of disorderly behaviour 122 when the 
evidence was heard in the Greymouth District Court. 123 This was due to a decision by 
the presiding judge that the evidence did not support the former charge. 124 He was 
convicted, sentenced to a $150 fine and ordered to pay court costs of $300. 125 
Brooker appealed to the High Court on the basis that the District Court judge 
had misapplied the law by failing to apply it consistently with his right to freedom of 
expression as guaranteed by law, 126 which in effect meant that the judge had not 
interpreted the provision under which he was charged in such a way that a definition 
which interfered the least with his BORA right was preferred. 127 In particular, he 
argued that the definition of "disorderly" favoured by the District Court judge failed 
in that respect. 128 His appeal was dismissed. 129 He appealed again to the Court of 
Appeal, which also dismissed his appeal unanimously. 130 He appealed a final time to 
the Supreme Court and his conviction was quashed, but only by a margin of three to 
two.131 It is submitted that this illustrates the difficulties experienced by the judiciary 
in reconciling the tension between the right to freedom of expression and the 
countervailing interest in protecting privacy. 
1 19 Ibid, para 17 Elias CJ. 
120 Ibid, para 18 Elias CJ. 
12 1 Summary Offences Act 1981 , s 21(1 )(d). 
122 Summary Offences Act 1981 , s 4(1 )(a). 
123 Brooker v Police, above n 6, para 17 Elias CJ. 124 Ibid. 
125 Ibid, para 18 Elias CJ. 
126 R v Brooker, above n 107, para 9 William Young J for the Court. 127 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 6. 
128 Brooker v Police, above n 6, para 20, Elias J. 129 Ibid. 
130 R v Brooker, above n 107, para 32 William Young J for the Court. 131 Brooker v Police, above n 6, para 289 Thomas J. 
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C Achieving the Balance: The Approaches of the Supreme Court Bench to 
BORA Application 
It is submitted that the various approaches to BORA application taken by 
members of the bench who presided in Brooker are an important aspect of the case 
and had a great influence on the outcome arrived at by each Justice. This also means 
that the relationship between .freedom of expression and privacy in future cases where 
BORA is relevant is likely to be determined, at least in part, by the approach to 
BORA application chosen by the presiding judge or judges. In this section, the 
approach to BORA application adopted by each justice in Brooker will be described 
and analysed in order to determine the strengths and weaknesses of their approaches 
and the consequences of each approach for the legal relationship between freedom of 
expression and privacy. 
I Chief Justice Elias 
In her approach to BORA application, Chief Justice Elias focused on the 
meaning of section 4(l)(a) of the Summary Offences Act, the enactment under which 
Brooker was convicted. She stated that the acceptance by the courts in the previous 
hearings of the case of the definition of "disorderly behaviour" as being "behaviour 
which would be unacceptable to right-thinking members of society" was wrong, as 
that definition had been determined from cases decided prior to the enactment of 
BORA. 132 As section six of BORA requires that legislation must be given an 
interpretation which is consistent with the rights and freedoms contained in BORA 
where such an interpretation is open to the judge, she considered it necessary to revisit 
the definition of the term. She needed to determine whether "disorderly behaviour" 
could be given a meaning which was consistent with Brooker's right to freedom of 
expression, affirmed by section 14 of BORA. 133 She decided that, although it was 
possible for someone exercising freedom of expression to be in breach of section 
4(l)(a) of the Summary Offences Act, and freedom of expression could therefore 
132 Brooker v Police, above n 6, paras 20 and 36 Elias CJ. 
133 Ibid, para 4 Elias CJ. 
36 
a 
l 
h 
0 
d 
e: 
n 
p, 
w 
se 
co 
134 
135 
136 
137 
138 
0 
y 
e 
.S 
e 
0 
.e 
d 
:s 
,f 
1e 
:h 
lS 
1r 
lS 
m 
A 
:it 
r" 
as 
m 
re 
potentially be abrogated under the provision, the effect of the expressive act would 
need to reach a level where "there is a clear danger of disruption rising far above 
armoyance" before the section could be rightly invoked. 134 As the circumstances of 
Brooker's arrest did not include any indication that Brooker's expressive act had 
reached the requisite level of harm, she concluded that Brooker had been wrongfully 
arrested and decided that his conviction ought to be quashed. 135 
Chief Justice Elias did not ignore the argument advanced by the Crown that, 
despite the fact that there is no explicit right to privacy in BORA, courts in other 
jurisdictions with no explicit right to privacy have upheld an analogous right. 136 She 
addressed it by stating that, she had "misgivings about whether it is open to the Courts 
to adjust the rights enacted by Parliament by balancing them against values not 
contained in the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, such as privacy." 137 She also 
considered that where ''the enactment being applied unmistakably identifies the value 
as relevant," a right or value which is not contained in BORA may be taken into 
account. 138 As the offence of disorderly behaviour was not drafted in such a way that it 
unmistakably identifies personal privacy as a relevant interest, Chief Justice Elias ' 
had no reason to take it into account under her interpretation of the relevant law. 
One potential weakness in Chief Justice Elias' reasoning in regard to whether 
or not she could consider Constable Croft's right to privacy in coming to her 
determination about the relevant definition of "disorderly" is that she does not make 
any attempt to consider the effect of section 28 of BORA. This section states that "An 
existing right or freedom shall not be held to be abrogated or restricted by reason only 
that the right or freedom is not included in this Bill of Rights or is included only in 
part." Potentially, this section could be interpreted to mean that judges are able to take 
rights into account in determining the appropriate definition of a term in a statute 
which are not explicitly stated by Parliament to be applicable to that right. Indeed, it 
seems as if section 28 would be entirely redundant unless it is to have this purpose, as 
courts are already required to interpret legislation consistently with that legislation' s 
134 Ibid, para 42 Elias Cl 
135 Ibid, para 50 Elias Cl 
136 Ibid, 95. 
137 Ibid, para 40 Elias CJ. 
138 Ibid. 
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own wording. Chief Justice Elias' example of being able to consider rights not in 
BORA in interpreting statutory provisions if those additional rights have been 
explicitly identified by Parliament as relevant seems redundant in itself as such 
wording would already have to be considered by a judge in the absence of any section 
in BORA stating that rights and freedoms not included in BORA should not be 
abrogated. It is a reasonable submission that Parliament would not have enacted 
section 28 unless it intended it to have some effect. That effect surely musf be that 
judges have an ability to balance BORA rights against those which are not in BORA 
nor mentioned as being specifically applicable to the legislation in question when 
determining the appropriate definition of legislative provisions. 
Even ifmy submission in regard to the purpose of section 28 of BORA is held 
to be correct, it is possible to argue that it would not affect the substance of Chief 
Justice Elias' interpretation of "disorderly" as privacy cannot be considered to be a 
right at law in New Zealand. Consequently, in effectively eroding Constable Croft's 
expectation of freedom from physical intrusion in her home by upholding Brooker's 
right to freedom of expression, there would be no section 28 breach as the expectation 
which was eroded by the decision was not, in fact a right. Although this was definitely 
true in the past, and privacy was not included as a right in BORA partially because its 
legal status was not far enough evolved at the time that BORA was debated and 
enacted, it is submitted that this position is now open to serious challenge. As has 
been described above, there are now a number of instruments - including those 
recognised by the common law, legislative instruments and quasi-legislative 
instruments - which have the purpose of protecting privacy. Additionally, New 
Zealand is a state party to the United Nations' International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights which specifically states that "no one shall be subjected to arbitrary or 
unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to 
unlawful attacks on his honour and reputation." 139 The fact that home is included in 
this right is particularly pertinent to the situation in Brooker, as the protest took place 
right outside of Constable Croft's home and within her earshot. It is more difficult to 
deny that protection of privacy has evolved to the point that it is able to be recognized 
as a right in the current legislative climate. It is submitted that this denial of privacy as 
139 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (19 December 1966) 999 UNTS 171 , art 17(1). 
38 
t 
( 
e 
a 
a 
I( 
e: 
p 
lf 
0 
er 
cc 
140 
141 
142 
143 
1 
1 
1 
1 
e 
j 
Lt 
\ 
n 
d 
:f 
a 
·s 
's 
n 
.y 
ts 
td 
lS 
;e 
re 
w 
1d 
)r 
to 
In 
::e 
to 
~d 
as 
). 
a right which exists outside of BORA is no longer an appropriate interpretation of the 
law. 
If it is concluded that privacy is in fact a right, then Chief Justice Elias would 
have needed to take it into account when formulating her BORA-compliant definition 
of "disorderly behaviour." Failure to do so would result in the abrogation of the right 
to privacy simply because it is not a BORA right, and this would be inconsistent with 
section 28. If it is concluded that privacy is not a right, then Chief Justice Elias' 
definition of disorderly is correct in law, even though it may prevent some people 
from being free from unwanted expression directed at them when they are in their 
homes by people who are in the street or on other publicly-accessible land. It is 
because of this uncertainty about the status of privacy that suggestions for reforms 
will be considered. 
2 Justice McGrath 
The approach of Justice McGrath, who came to an opposite conclusion to 
that of Chief Justice Elias, is in sharp contrast to Chief Justice Elias' approach. Like 
Chief Justice Elias, he identified that the enactment of BORA changed the legislative 
environment in which the offence of disorderly behaviour needed to be interpreted, 
and that the offence must be read consistently with the right to freedom of expression 
affirmed by section fourteen of BORA. 140 However, unlike Chief Justice Elias, he 
identified that there were two interests which conflicted with the right to freedom of 
expression: the interest in maintaining public order; 141 and the interest in protecting 
privacy. 142 After setting out the competing interests, he undertook a balancing exercise 
in accordance with section five of BORA to reconcile them with the right to freedom 
of expression. 143 
It is submitted that the balancing exercise undertaken by Justice McGrath 
enabled him to make a fuller consideration of all the facts of the case, and is more 
consistent with the overall scheme of BORA. Instead of taking the fact that Brooker 
140Brooker v Police, above n 6, para 113 McGrath J. 
141 Ibid, para 118 McGrath J. 
142 th Ibid, para 122 McGra J. 
143 Ibid, paras 130-146 McGrath J. 
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was exerc1smg his right to freedom of expression when he was arrested and 
concluding that the meaning of the provision under which he was arrested must be 
read so that it does not interfere with freedom of expression as far as is possible, he 
was able to take into consideration the competing values and interests which were 
affected by Mr Brooker's decision to exercise his right to freedom of expression in the 
way that he did. His approach was therefore consistent with section 28, which is the 
major contrast between his approach and Chief Justice Elias' approach. 
Justice McGrath's approach to BORA application in Brooker is correct in law 
if privacy is considered to be a right that ought not to be abrogated or restricted 
simply by reason that it is not a BORA right. If privacy does have this status, then it is 
able to be included in the balancing exercise to determine the BORA-compliant 
meaning of the legislation at issue. If it is not a right, it is difficult to determine the 
legal basis upon which privacy was considered by Justice McGrath to be a relevant 
consideration in regard to the question of the meaning of "disorderly." BORA only 
requires that legislation which is able to be interpreted consistently with BORA rights 
is given that interpretation in the event of competing potential interpretations and that 
rights and freedoms which are not in BORA are not abrogated by that reason only. It 
does not require that any identifiable interest which may be applicable in the situation 
is considered in the balancing exercise. 
It is submitted that Justice McGrath's consideration of public order does not 
suffer the same problem as his consideration of privacy as an interest which should be 
balanced against Brooker's right to freedom of expression in order to determine 
whether or not Brooker's behaviour was disorderly. It should be remembered that the 
purpose of having an offence of disorderly behaviour is to protect public order. It is 
therefore possible to argue that public order becomes a relevant consideration by 
virtue of section five of BORA, which states that ''the rights and freedoms contained 
in this Bill of Rights may be subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law 
as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society." The job of the 
judge then becomes arriving at a defmition of "disorderly behaviour" which strikes an 
appropriate balance between the importance of protecting Brooker's right to freedom 
of expression when he is exercising that right in the public space against the interest 
of the public at large in regulating the behaviour of people using public space. The 
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interest in public order must additionally be a reasonable limit which is demonstrably 
justified. 
It is submitted that Justice McGrath's decision that arresting a person who is 
using the public space in order to express their opinion of another person who is in 
their own home and who does not want to receive the opinion so expressed is a 
demonstrably justified limitation on the freedom of expression. If a member of the 
public (A) is asked whether he or she thinks that another person (B) is making 
appropriate use of public space when B is standing right outside A's home and is 
providing information or an opinion directed at A, who is inside his or her home, 
where the information or opinion is something that A does not wish to hear, it is very 
unlikely that A would regard B 's behaviour as an acceptable use of the public space 
which ought to be protected. Yet, the majority decision in Brooker decides that, to the 
contrary, the behaviour described above is an appropriate use of public space and 
ought not to constitute an offence if such behaviour is indulged in by any individual. 
In conclusion, Justice McGrath's approach only appears to be correct in law if 
privacy is considered to be a right. If it is not, it is difficult to see how it can fit into 
the statutory scheme provided by BORA for interpretation of legislation as a relevant 
part of the balancing exercise. If he had not considered privacy to be a relevant 
element in the balancing exercise, and if instead he relied only upon the value of 
protecting public order as something which ought to be able to justifiably abrogate 
freedom of expression, then his approach would also seem to be correct in law. 
3 Justice Blanchard 
Justice Blanchard's approach to BORA application was similar to that of 
Justice McGrath. He conducted the section five balancing exercise, but instead of 
balancing freedom of expression against public order and Constable Croft's interest in 
protecting her privacy, he balanced the interest in public order against the freedom of 
expression under the circumstances of the case. His final determination to allow the 
appeal and overturn Brooker's conviction rested heavily upon the facts that the protest 
41 
was of short duration and that it occurred during the daytime. 
144 He stated that if the 
protest had been repetitive or had been of longer duration or louder, he might have 
come to a different conclusion. 145 
Justice Blanchard's approach is therefore correct in law, if the submission 
about Justice McGrath's decision which was considered above is deemed to be 
correct. As Justice Blanchard does not consider privacy, the correctness of his 
judgment does not rest on the question of whether privacy is properly considered to be 
a right or not. 
Justice Blanchard's judgment is interesting as it takes a very practical 
approach to the question of whether or not Brooker was rightly arrested. He leaves it 
open as to whether a similar act on the part of another person, undertaken under 
slightly different circumstances, would reach a level at which he considered that they 
had begun to behave in a disorderly manner, rendering that person liable to be 
arrested. For example, if the police had taken an hour to come to Constable Croft's 
aid, rather than the 12 minutes which it took them on the facts of the case, and 
Brooker was still staging his protest when they arrived, it is possible that Justice 
Blanchard would have considered his arrest to have been warranted. If that was the 
case, then the decision would have been to uphold the arrest, by a margin of three to 
two, rather than the actual decision in the case which was to quash the arrest by a 
margin of three to two. 
4 Justice Tipping 
Justice Tipping's approach to BORA interpretation was similar to that of 
Chief Justice Elias. Rather than using section five as a means of balancing the 
competing interests of freedom of expression on the one hand, and the interest in 
protecting public order and possibly privacy in the home on the other, he stated that 
the fact that Brooker was exercising a right protected by BORA meant that the type of 
behaviour necessary in order for it to qualify as disorderly behaviour is beyond that 
144 Ibid, paras 69-70 Blanchard J. 
145 Ibid, para 70 Blanchard J. 
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which would be required if no exercise of BORA rights were involved. 146 Like Chief 
Justice Elias, Justice Tipping ignored section 28 entirely, and so it is unsurprising that 
he did not consider it necessary to include Constable Croft's right to, or interest in, 
her privacy in her home in his balance of relevant considerations. It is also 
unsurpnsmg that he came to the conclusion that Brooker's appeal ought to be 
allowed. 
This approach is correct in law if privacy is not considered to be a right. If it is 
considered to be a right, then it would be necessary for Justice Tipping to consider 
privacy in his determination of the correct interpretation of "disorderly behaviour," 
otherwise he would be abrogating a right simply because it was not a BORA right, 
which would be inconsistent with section 28 of BORA. 
5 Justice Thomas 
Justice Thomas' approach to BORA interpretation was similar to that of 
Justice McGrath and he came to the same conclusion as Justice McGrath. The most 
noteworthy part of Justice Thomas' approach is his discussion of rights as compared 
to limits on rights. He noted that, in BORA, it is only limits on BORA rights that need 
to be demonstrably justified in terms of section five. 147 He also stated that if the 
justification for an act which limits a right is the protection of another right, even one 
which is not included in BORA, then there is no requirement that the limit be 
justified, as the rights should have equal footing. 148 
Justice Thomas then demonstrated why privacy should be considered a right in 
itself He stated that as the right to freedom of expression is intended to protect the 
underlying fundamental value of human dignity and the same is true for privacy, both 
rights should be given an equal status.149 Then, he applied the particular circumstances 
of the case to the starting point of equal protection for the rights. 150 It was therefore an 
146 
Ibid, para 91 Tipping J 
147 Ibid, para 210 Thomas J 
148 Ibid, para 209 Thomas J 
149 Ibid, para 231 Thomas J 
150 Ibid, para 243 Thomas J 
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easy step for him to determine that the manner of Brooker's protest was such that his 
arrest was not an infringement of Brooker's freedom of expression. 
Justice Thomas' decision is correct in law if privacy is considered to be a 
right. It is submitted that his arguments in favour of recognising privacy as a right are 
compelling. He points towards the recent proliferation of legal and quasi-legal 
protection for privacy interests, as well as New Zealand's international obligations, as 
evidence that there is indeed a right to privacy. 
D Conclusion 
Most members of the Supreme Court bench in Brooker v Police chose to apply 
BORA in different ways. Different considerations impacted upon the decision arrived 
at by each judge. It is the author's opinion that the case was rightly decided in the 
Supreme Court on the basis of the current law, but that the decision which was arrived 
at is an inappropriate infringement on an important aspect of privacy. That aspect is 
the right to be free from having to hear unsought and unwanted expression of opinion 
whilst the hearer is in their home. This forms part of the physical aspect of the right to 
privacy, which has previously been described as inadequately protected by current 
law. 
V POTENTIAL LAW REFORM 
This paper has aimed to convince the reader that the current legal relationship 
between freedom of expression and privacy is inappropriately weighted in favour of 
freedom of expression, in cases where one person's right to freedom of expression 
interferes with another person's right to physical privacy. The case of Brooker v 
Police is one particularly recent example of the problems inherent in the current legal 
relationship. In this section, possible ideas for reform of the law in order to arrive at a 
more appropriate balance will be suggested and analysed to determine their likelihood 
of drawing a more appropriate balance. 
A Interpret Section 14 of BORA to Include Privacy Considerations. 
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A simple suggestion for law reform which would not require the formation of 
any new common law action or any legislative intervention would be if the courts 
interpreted the right to freedom of expression affirmed by section 14 of BORA to 
include the right to freedom from expression. It has been suggested by Butler and 
Butler that the right to be free from expression is included in the BORA right. 151 
If the facts in Brooker came up again, but this time the right to freedom of 
expression was included as part of the right to freedom of expression, then it would be 
necessary for the judges to balance Brooker's right to freedom of expression with 
Constable Croft's right to be free from that expression (in effect her right to physical 
privacy in her home) in their determination of the correct interpretation of "disorderly 
behaviour." It is therefore possible that Chief Justice Elias particularly might have 
come up with a different outcome, as might Justice Tipping. If just one of them were 
to change their decision, then Brooker's arrest would have been upheld. 
It is submitted that including the right to be free from expression in the right to 
freedom of expression is not the best way of protecting a physical right to privacy. It 
renders the right to freedom of expression largely meaningless, transforming it into 
some sort of right to expressive autonomy. The interests which underlie freedom of 
expression are not exactly the same as those which underlie privacy (although, it is 
accepted that they have at least one very similar underlying value in common). 
Consequently, including the right to be free from expression in the right to freedom of 
expression does little to guide judges as to the appropriate balance to be made in a 
particular case. 
B Develop the Tort of Invasion of Privacy So That It Is Capable of Providing 
Protection against Physical Intrusions into Privacy 
Another possible way of reforming the current law so that there is greater 
protection for physical privacy is to extend the current tort of invasion of privacy so 
that it can also be utilised by plaintiffs who are faced with an unwanted intrusion into 
their physical privacy. 
151 Butler and Butler, above n I, 321. 
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There are a number of reasons why this suggestion is inappropriate. Firstly, it 
does not seem to provide an appropriate remedy for invasions into physical privacy. A 
person who has had their physical privacy invaded by another person is unlikely to 
want to have to sue that person in order to ensure that they stop what they are doing. 
Firstly, the claimant would have already suffered the invasion. This means that it 
cannot be used pro-actively to stop someone who is in the process of invading a 
claimant's privacy, as all action has to be taken after the fact. 
It would also likely be difficult for a court to determine an appropriate level of 
damages, as the harm which is caused is essentially emotional or mental, rather than 
physical or economic. 152 In contrast, when a defendant such as a newspaper or 
magazine intends to publish private information about an individual, that individual 
may be able to get an injunction to stop the publication from occurring, thus 
preventing the harm, 153 or may get damages. 154 Damages in this situation are more 
easily calculated, as can be seenfrom Douglas v Hello!, where Hello! magazine was 
forced to pay damages in excess of £ 1 million to the owners of OK! magazine 
following Hello! 's publication of photos of Michael Douglas and Catherine Zeta-
Jones' wedding, as the publication of the photos was considered to be in breach of 
confidence owed to OK! (the British version of the tort of privacy).
155 Sole publication 
rights to the Douglas and Zeta-Jones wedding had been sold to OK, and the owners of 
Hello! were aware of the deal. 156 
There is also a concern that the tort will only be utilised by claimants who are 
undeserving of a remedy, and are simply using it to "get back at" the defendant.
157 
This argument is advanced in most cases where the damage is emotional harm rather 
than economic or physical harm, and apprehension of the difficulty of proving the tort 
by potential claimants and their lawyers has meant that such torts are seldom utilised 
152 Kalven Jr, above n 59, 330. 
153 See, for example, P v D, above n 83, para 50 (HC) Nicholson J. 
154 See, for example, L v G, above n 83, 251 Judge TM Abbott. 
155 Douglas and Others v Hello ' Ltd and Others (No 3) [2007) UKHL 21 paras 126-131 Hoffinan LJ. 
156 Ibid . 
157 Kalven Jr, above n 59, 338 . 
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The tort of intentional infliction of emotional harm is a good example of 
the under-utilisation of a tort which is concerned with redressing emotional harm. 
There is also a practical problem with extending the tort so that it includes 
redress for physical invasions of privacy. The current tort evolved from the tort of 
breach of confidence, which protected the claimant from having information (mostly 
commercial information) disclosed by another person when such a disclosure was in 
breach of a duty to keep it confidential. 159 It is therefore firmly focused on the 
informational aspect of privacy. It is unclear whether the judiciary would be willing to 
extend it to include physical privacy without having at least some precedent for doing 
so. It has been suggested that the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress 
could be extended to cover physical privacy protection. This would provide a 
precedent base from which judges could extend the law. However, since the tort itself 
is so seldom utilised, it is uncertain whether any claimant would be likely to bring a 
case which would allow the judiciary to make any such developments, particularly 
when the issues described above are taken into account. 
C Include a Right to Privacy in BORA 
Another suggestion for law reform is to include a right to privacy in BORA. It 
has previously been argued that the proliferation of privacy protection in New 
Zealand suggests that it has got to the point where it ought to be considered as a legal 
right. Including a right to privacy in BORA would have the advantage that it would be 
unambiguously included in the section five balancing exercise, wherever the right was 
relevant to the consideration of the legislation at issue. There would be no more 
problems with determining whether it ought to be considered a "right" or simply as a 
"value" or "interest." Also , it is submitted that inclusion of a right to privacy in 
BORA is appropriate to ensure that the important underlying value of human dignity 
is adequately protected under law. By including a right to privacy in BORA, the 
Legislature would be making a statement that it is a fundamental right, rather than a 
158 Ibid . 
159 Bridget K Murphy " Developments in the Law of Invasion of Privacy in New Zealand and England" 
(2000-2003) 9 AULR 1031 , 1042. 
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simple limit on actual rights. The wording of a right to privacy could be based o
n 
what is in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, or it could hav
e 
different wording as determined by the Legislature. 
It is submitted that this is the most appropriate and likely the most effective 
way of addressing the problem of the current legal balance between freedom 
of 
expression and privacy. However, it should be noted that such a solution is unlikely 
to 
be quick, as it will require the will of the Legislature to make the change. 
VI CONCLUSION 
In this paper, the current legal relationship between the right to freedom of 
expression and the right to privacy has been described. It has been determined that 
there seems to be a lack of protection for physical privacy. Protection of information
al 
privacy, however, seems to be adequate, due to a number of common law, legislativ
e 
and quasi-legislative developments over the past few decades. The lack of protectio
n 
for physical privacy is a concern, as privacy protects the underlying value of huma
n 
dignity or inviolate personality, concepts which are at the core of current internation
al 
human rights discourse. It is because of this concept of human dignity that it seems t
o 
the author that the decision arrived at in Brooker v Police feels intuitively incorrect
, 
even though it has been concluded that it is almost certainly correct in law
. 
Consequently, it has been submitted that some type of legal reform is required 1
11 
order to provide more adequate protection for privacy. 
After considering a number of different options for reform, it has been 
suggested that the most appropriate way to ensure that physical privacy is give
n 
appropriate protection by law is to include a right to privacy in BORA. This woul
d 
affirm that privacy is a constitutionally important concept, something which ha
s 
already been recognised in a number of other states. It would also ensure that privac
y 
is taken into account when the interpretation of any law in which privac
y 
considerations are relevant is being undertaken by members of the judiciary. It 
is 
submitted that such treatment of privacy is necessary in order to prevent its gradua
l 
erosion. As privacy is a quiet right, it is very easy to overlook it. To do so would be t
o 
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undermine an important aspect of human dignity, the most fundamental human right 
that we have. 
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